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 The author analyzes the formation, functioning and termination of the man-
date of the first coalition governments in the history of Croatia between 2000 and 
2003. She suggests that the parliamentary system of moderate pluralism after the 
elections, as well as the pre-electoral coalition agreements, contributed to the 
building of coalition governments, but that this process was undermined by a lack 
of a developed coalition political culture among the creators of the coalition as 
well as among the public in general. The coalition governments operated on the 
basis of a written coalition agreement that identified the mechanisms for coalition 
management among the coalition partners and implicitly introduced voting disci-
pline in the parliament and the patterns of the distribution of posts in ministries, 
parliamentary bodies and public companies. Its main drawback were sketchy pub-
lic policies which means that these were policy blind coalitions. The first coalition 
government (2000-2002) was terminated due to the feuding among the key coali-
tion partners, and the second coalition government (2002-2003) ended due to the 
regular parliamentary elections. Though the government of 2000-2002 was the 
first coalition government in Croatia’s history and an oversized coalition govern-
ment to boot, it nevertheless lasted longer than the average similar governments in 
other European countries.  
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Building coalition governments 
After the fourth parliamentary elections in January of 2000, Croatia was for the first 
time faced with the need to form a coalition government; it was confronted with the 
same challenge after the fifth elections in November 2003. In both cases the main insti-
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tutional/political conditions for building coalition governments were relatively favour-
able. After the elections a moderate pluralist system was established in the parliament, 
i.e. the effective number of parties immediately after the elections was not bigger than 
five. The parliamentary party system at the end of the mandates of the first two coalition 
governments in 2003 was somewhat more fragmented due to the factioning within the 
biggest opposition party (HDZ) and the second strongest party of the ruling coalition 
(HSLS). The MPs who quit the HDZ or were expelled from it, formed as many as four 
new parties; consequently, out of its 40 seats of the regular assembly, the HDZ lost ten 
or 25%, and out of its initial 46 seats in the general assembly it lost as many as 13 or 
28%.1 Following the split within the HSLS, caused by this party’s leadership’s decision 
in 2002 to step out of the coalition, a sizable faction of ten representatives split off and 
later constituted the Libra, a new liberal party. In this way, at the end of the four-year 
legislative mandate the nominal number of the parties in the Sabor increased from the 
initial 13 to 18, and the effective number from 4.5 to 5.9. This factioning probably af-
fected the functioning of the parliament, and the HSLS factioning surely had an impact 
on the activities of the first coalition as it weakened the parliamentary support the coali-
tion enjoyed at the beginning of the mandate. Coalition theories have always empha-
sized the importance of intraparty factioning since neither coalitions nor their member-
parties are homogeneous political actors (see Laver and Schofield, 1990).  
 The effective number of parties in the Croatian Sabor after the fourth and the fifth 
cycle of parliamentary elections was smaller than in most European postcommunist de-
mocracies after their third or fourth parliamentary election cycle organized according to 
the proportional electoral system (see Shvetsova, 2002, 76). This moderate fragmenta-
tion of the parliament was largely a consequence of the Croatian type of the PR system 
that prevented a replication of an extremely fragmented electoral party system in the 
Sabor. Two mechanisms were pivotal in this: the magnitude of the electoral districts and 
the legal electoral threshold.  
 Although the critics of the Croatian electoral system claimed that the five-percent le-
gal electoral threshold is too low and consequently impractical in 14-mandate electoral 
districts,2 their fears were not confirmed because of the large number of political actors 
that vied for the votes in all electoral units. In a moderately fragmented electoral party 
system, the theoretical threshold of exclusion in the 14-mandate districts should really 
be higher than 5% (around 6.7% of the votes).3 However, since between 23 and 31 elec-
toral lists competed in the electoral districts in 2000 (i.e. on the average more than 26 
lists per electoral district), the natural threshold of inclusion was lower (between 2.3 and 
2.8% of the votes). In the 2003 elections, the competition was even more atomized: 
between 31 and 40 electoral lists or about 34 lists on the average, while the natural 
threshold of inclusion ranged between 1.9 and 2.3% of the votes. Thus the 5% legal 
 
1 By the regular assembly of the unicameral parliament we refer to the 140 representatives elected in the 
proportional national elections in ten equal-size constituencies; the full assembly also includes the representa-
tives of the ethnic minorities (five in 2000 and eight in 2003), elected in plurality elections, and the represen-
tatives of the “Croatian diaspora” (six in 2000 and four in 2003), chosen by plurality elections in a single 
worldwide electoral district. Thus in the fourth mandate there was a total of 151 representatives, and in the 
fifth mandate 152 representatives.  
2 These objections may be dismissed theoretically. For example, according to Lijphart’s formula 
[75%:(M+1)], in which M = average magnitude of electoral districts, the theoretical natural electoral threshold 
would be exactly 5%, i.e. would equal the legal electoral threshold (Lijphart, 1999., 153).  
3 On the theoretical threshold of inclusion and exclusion see: Rae, 1971; Rae, Hanby and Loosemore, 
1971; Lijphart, 1994; Katz, 1997: 126; concisely in Kasapović, 2003: 154-156. 
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electoral threshold played the key role in the prevention of the parliamentarization of a 
big number of parties; it also prevented atomized pluralism.  
 The second major reason for the moderated parliamentary fragmentation, despite a 
rather atomized electoral competition, was the very nature of electoral competition in 
which a huge number of irrelevant political parties participated: protoparties, weak 
electoral alliances and unprofiled local lists of independent candidates. In the elections 
of 2000, 53 parties took part; in 2003 even more - 58. Most of them enjoyed the support 
of a very small, even insignificant number of voters. However and despite repeated 
electoral failures both in the national and the local elections, they somehow manage to 
keep afloat, creating an illusion of their permanence. Also, many of them entered into 
loose, shifting, and doomed electoral alliances, additionally increasing the nominal 
number of electoral actors. In the elections of 2000, 14 electoral alliances took part; in 
2003 their number increased to 21; they comprised between two and five parties. And 
finally, the atomized electoral competition was generated by a big number of the so-
called non-party or independent lists: in 2000 there were 18 such lists, and in 2003 as 
many as 37. This explosion of independent lists cannot be explained by their political 
successes, since no independent list has ever won a mandate in the Sabor.4 In short, the 
electoral competition in Croatia is not only disturbingly atomized but this atomization is 
on the rise. Consequently, the electoral system ought to prevent an atomized parliamant. 
It has performed this onerous task more or less with flying colours. A relatively high 
nominal number of parties in all the legislative periods so far, including the last two, is 
the consequence of the parliamentarization of several small parties owing to their elec-
toral alliances with bigger parties. Without this, the effective and especially the nominal 
number of parliamentary parties would be smaller, which would facilitate the stabiliza-
tion of the party system and the party landscape on the whole, and enhance the parlia-
ment’s efficacy. The major parties in Croatia have not yet become aware of that prob-
lem and have not accepted the responsibility for stabilizing the party system and the po-
litical system in general. The electoral coalitions thus emerge as an “institutional de-
signer” of a fragmented or, more optimistically, a somewhat fragmented parliament.  
 Another condition that was conducive to the formation of the first coalition govern-
ment was its meticulous pre-programming by means of the preelectoral agreements of 
the opposition parties that came to power in 2000. The opposition competed in the elec-
tions in two electoral coalitions: the coalition of the SDP and the HSLS - in some elec-
toral districts joined by two minor regional parties (SBHS and PGS) - and in the elec-
toral coalition of the HSS, HNS, LS and IDS, occasionally joined by the ASH. All those 
parties, except the ASH, managed to get into the parliament, and after the elections 
formed the majority parliamentary coalition with 95 or almost 62.9% of the seats. The 
six leading parties of the two coalitions built the government on the basis of the signed 
preelectoral agreements (see Plećaš, 2000). As the number of the parties that would 
constitute the coalition government was preprogrammed by means of the pre-electoral 
coalition agreements, its formation went smoothly. The entire procedure lasted less than 
a month: the election was held on 3 January, President of the state nominated the gov-
ernment on 27 January, and the Sabor voted it in on 2 February 2000.5 
 
4 This doubling of the number of independent lists may partly be perhaps explained by their marked suc-
cess in local elections in 2001 (see Kasapović, 2004).  
5 At that time, Croatia had a semipresidential system of government, according to which the cabinet was 
appointed by the president and confirmed by the majority of votes in the Sabor. The government’s mandate 
formally commenced on the day of its appointment by the president and not on the day of its parliamentary 
investiture. Since the president died in December of 1999, and the new presidential elections were held in 
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 Unlike this, the process of building the coalition government in 2003 was not 
preprogrammed by any formal pre-election agreements, although based on the pre-
electoral party consultations it was known who might take part in the future govern-
ment. In the post-electoral talks on the composition of the government, initially five 
parties took part (HDZ, HSS, HSP, HSLS, DC), but two of them abandoned the nego-
tiations in the initial stage: the HSS and the HSP; the HSP because the party leadership 
was not formally ready to enter into a coalition with the HDZ due to the differences in 
the economic policies and the general politics of these two parties; the HSS claimed that 
the HDZ did not have a clear-cut policy profile and that there was no serious policy 
platform of the future government. However, the HSS leadership overlooked the fact 
that the HDZ as a big party necessarily has an all-embracing policy orientation and is 
consequently weakly profiled. The HSS, as a minor party, must resort to the strategy of 
a more narrow policy profiling – and the HSS failed to do so – that might guarantee it a 
bigger electoral competitiveness and a more forceful coalition potential (see Bolleyer, 
2004, 134 and elsewhere). But the real reason was the fear of the HSS leadership that 
the more dominant coalition partner might literally “devour” it. This fear was well-
founded because the HDZ and the HSS are relatively ideologically affiliated parties and 
they competed for the largely same electorate; thus, the electoral failure of the HSS in 
2003 was to a large extent caused by the fact that a number of its voters shifted their al-
legiance to the HDZ. The second party, the HSP, was for all purposes shut out from the 
talks because of an outcry by the international community regarding the ideological and 
political profile of that party.6 Later, due to the publicly still undisclosed reasons, the 
HSLS also abandoned the negotiations about the formation of the government.7 Eventu-
ally, the only HDZ’s coalition partner that remained was the DC, with a single seat in 
the Sabor. Thus a formally minority coalition government was formed because these 
two parties had 67 or 46.5% of the seats in the Sabor.8 However, the government en-
 
February of 2000, the president of the parliament – who, according to the Constitution, took over as president 
– appointed the prime minister and the cabinet on 27 January 2000, while the Sabor voted them in on 2 Febru-
ary 2000. The coalition government of 2003 was ushered in by a positive parliamentary investiture since the 
constitutional reform of 2000 replaced the existing semipresidential system with the parliamentary system. On 
the forms of government investituture in semipresidential systems – despite the author’s controversial defini-
tion of semipresidentialism – see Elgie, 1999.  
6 In Croatia, there was a sort of a redux of the “Austrian syndrome”, though with a different outcome. Just 
as it negatively reacted to the coalition government of the Austrian Folk’s Party (ÖVP) that included the right-
wing Freedom Party (FPÖ), the European Union strongly objected to the possibility of the creation of a coali-
tion government of the HDZ with the rightist HSP. However, in Austria the contentious coalition government 
was formed regardlessly, while in Croatia the HDZ forswore the coalition with the HSP, primarily because 
they feared that the European Union might use this as a pretext to turn down the Croatian candidacy for the 
membership. It should be noted, however, that even prior to the elections of 2003 the HSP had already re-
markably revised its ideological profile, political rhetoric and practice, and that it has continued in that direc-
tion after the elections of 2003, a shift form the ultra-right end of the Croatian political spectrum to the centre-
right.  
7 President of the HSLS, Mr Ivan Čehok, explained this by Prime Minister Ivo Sanader’s intention to have 
“at the ministerial level a one-party cabinet”, which did not happen since the Ministry of Justice went to the 
DC. The HSLS was eventually represented in the government at the level of ministerial deputies/secretaries. 
The president of the HSLS called the relationship of his party with the HDZ “an incomplete coalition relation-
ship”: “On principled grounds this may not be the most fortunate solution, but from the point of view of the 
strength of the HSLS, this may be much better for us than a formal coalition” (Večernji list, 2 January, 2004).  
8 Technically, this was a minority coalition government, but substantially it might be said this was a 
minority one-party government, not only because of the symbolic presence of the DC in the government. 
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joyed the support of the absolute parliamentary majority since the HDZ, by means of a 
series of separate political agreements after the election managed to secure the support 
of the three representatives of the HSU, the two represenatives of HSLS, the one repre-
sentative of the HDSS, and the eight representatives of ethnic minorities, among them 
the three representatives of the SDSS.9 In this way the HDZ forged a majority 
parliamentary coalition that supported the formally minority coalition government: out 
of the 140 representatives from the regular assembly of the Sabor the coalition encom-
passed 63 or 45%, and out of the 152 representatives of the full asssembly it enjoyed the 
support of as many as 81 or the absolute majority of 53.3% of the MPs. The talks for-
mally lasted a month – from 23 November, when the election took place, until 23 De-
cember, when the parliament voted in with the absolute majority of the votes the minor-
ity HDZ and DC government – but actually they ended a few days earlier when the 
mandator announced the composition of the future government. The government was 
built without any glitches. However, the political agreements did not have the force of 
the real coalition deals, and the government was from the start exposed to the erratic and 
volatile behaviour of the legislature members who have constantly threatened to with-
draw their support if the government fails to promote certain interests or make at least 
symbolic concessions in its policies – from the foreign policy to the minority policy, 
from the pension policy to the agricultural policy. The government’s fate has depended 
on the will of the politically varied and consequently unstable parliamentary majority, 
which has been an impediment to its smooth functioning.  
 If the above mentioned conditions favoured the building of coalition governments, 
the general political/cultural setting was not favourable. Croatia had no previous experi-
ence of coalition governments or a developed coalition political culture. In Croatia’s 
political history before 2000, there were no coalition governments. In the short period of 
parliamentary democracy between 1990 and 2000, all the governments were one-party 
governments (Table 2). One of the parties (HDZ) formed its governments three times in 
a row on the basis of the plurality of the votes (in 1990, 1992, and 1995). The govern-
ment of democratic unity (1991-2) was not coalitional but a wartime all-party govern-
ment that was all-dependant on the HDZ’s absolute parliamentary majority and on the 
incumbent president (HDZ) in the existing semipresidential system. The political actors 
had no necessary knowledge of how to create and particularly how to manage coalition 
governments. The public political discourse, shaped by the media, was not permeated 
by the deliberative spirit; consequently, political negotiation and compromise were in-
terpreted as “futile bargaining”, “political trade-offs”, “interparty bickering” and so on. 
This was not auspicious for the formation of a coalition government. 
 
Namely, the DC was a faction of the HDZ after the elections of 2000 and for a time it was considered to be a 
more liberal HDZ’s variant; journalists and political opponents called it the “HDZ light”. It never evolved into 
a proper party, and after the liberalization of the HDZ in the second half of the legislative mandate 2000-2003 
it lost almost all its raison d’être.  
9 The HDZ signed separate agreements with the representatives of ethnic minorities who thereby prom-
ised to support the government in the parliament; the government, in return, promised interest concessions in 
their policies or in government bodies. For example, the government in its Agreement on Cooperation with 
the SDSS committed itself that by June of 2004 it would provide for the return of the occupied houses and 
other property belonging to the Serbs who fled Croatia during the final military operations of the Croatian 
Army in 1995, which have been occupied illegally ever since, and that by the end of 2004 it would see that the 
other property be returned to their rightful owners. The SDSS also got several secretarial and deputy ministe-
rial posts in the ministries. The SDSS representatives commented on this agreement with the HDZ: “The 
agreement is a component of the Government’s program and is not a coalition agreement” (Večernji list, 2 
January, 2004). 
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 Types of coalition governments’ rule  
 How coalition governments rule in general depends on several elements: the coali-
tion agreements, the mechanisms of conflict resolution within coalitions, the coalition 
voting discipline, the patterns of department allocation and appointments, and the 
agreements concerning the policy-content and the appointments to senior public offices 
outside the cabinet and the parliament (Müller/Strøm, 1997: 2000). 
 1. It has already been mentioned that in Croatia the first coalition government of 
2000 was created on the basis of the pre-electoral coalition agreements of the six then 
opposition parties. In the two key documents – particularly in the Six-party Agreement 
(HNS, HSLS, HSS, IDS, LS, SDP) on the pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral co-
operation signed in September 1999, the signatories highlighted three fundamental prin-
ciples of its coalition policy: first, they pledged they would coordinate pre-electoral ac-
tivities of the two electoral coalitions, i.e. they made a sort of a political non-aggression 
pact during the election; second, they emphatically and explicitly ruled out any possi-
bility of the post-electoral coalition with the HDZ as their main political adversary in 
the past decade; third, they agreed to build the legislative and the executive government 
together if they won the election i.e. that they would create a parliamentary coalition 
and a coalition government in which each party would be represented proportionately to 
its in electoral results.  
 Due to the electoral outcomes, this as a matter of fact meant a creation of some sort 
of the oversized coalition government.10 The ruling parliamentary coalition included 90 
representatives from the regular assembly and five representatives of ethnic minorities, 
which means that the government could count on the 62.9% support in the legislature. 
From the perspective of the theory of the minimal winning coalition, which holds that 
an advantage of the coalition politics lies in maximizing its members’ benefits, this was 
an uneconomical coalition with surpluss parties which decreased the political benefits of 
the biggest electoral winners (the SDP and the HSLS), increased the costs of negotia-
tions and decision-making, expanded the ideological and policy scopes of the coalition 
and increased its conflict potentials. This almost cost the coalition its survival: because 
of the ideological and political disagreements the IDS was the first to quit the coalition 
though it remained in the parliamentary coalition. It was soon followed by a faction of 
the HSLS that stepped out of the coalition government and the parliamentary coalition. 
At that moment, the initial shortcoming of the ruling coalition became its major advan-
tage. Namely, despite the departure of 10 out of 24 HSLS representatives, the govern-
ment obtained the support of the majority of the representatives even in this altered po-
litical legislative composition. Also, the initial oversized coalition was appropriate be-
cause of the nature of the new government’s politics. Its essence were comprehensive 
reforms of the political and economic system that required a broad social and political 
 
10 An oversized coalition is defined by Arendt Lijphart as “any coalition cabinet based on a large 
supermajority of four-fifths – 80 percent – or more of the seats in the legislature” (1999, 106-107). Lijphart 
distinguishes between the oversized coalition in the substantive and the technical sense. The substantively 
oversized coalition is based on the absolute majority of the electoral votes and not only on the absolute man-
date majority, whereas the technically oversized coalition is based on the absolute mandate majority but not 
on the majority of the electoral votes. An example of the oversized technical coalition is the French Gaullist-
republican government in France in 1993 which had 81.8% of the seats, but only 39.9% of the votes won in 
the first electoral round. That oversized artificial mandate majority was a consequence of the two-round ma-
joritarian electoral system. If we apply these measures, then the Croatian coalition government of 2000 was 
nearer to the substantively than the technically oversized coalition as it was based on the absolute majority of 
the votes and on almost two-thirds of the mandates.  
 
Kasapović, M., Coalition Governments in Croatia: ..., Politička misao, Vol. XL, (2003), No. 5, pp. 52–67 58 
                                                                                                                                              
consensus. The ruling coalition parties represented the majority of the electorate – in the 
2000 election they secured the absolute majority of the votes – which also meant the 
popular support for the reformist policies. And finally, the constitutional reforms for-
mally required the two-thirds majority in the Sabor, which the first coalition govern-
ment relatively easily obtained owing to a few votes of the oppositon HSP. 
 After the election, the six parties signed the Coalition Agreement stipulating the 
manner in which the cabinet was to be formed and the House of Representatives man-
aged. This was a pilot example of a coalition agreement which neglected the policy di-
mension of the coalition politics and pushed the new coalition in the direction of policy-
blind coalitions.  
 2. The Coalition Agreement of 2000 in Croatia established two outside bodies for 
settling the disputes within the ruling coalition. The chief body was the Coalition Coor-
dination, made up of the head of government and the coalition parties’ presidents. This 
was not a cabinet body since at the beginning the presidents of four coalition parties – 
HSLS, HSS, HNS and LS – were not cabinet members; later and only briefly, the HSLS 
president was included in the first coalition cabinet (2000-2002), while in the second 
coalition cabinet (2002-2003), the LS president was a minister for a brief period. This 
turned out to be an unfortunate solution since the presidents of the parties that were not 
cabinet members complained about some sort of an information blockade, which addi-
tionally widened the gap between the cabinet members and the non-members and 
eventually caused major tensions, conflicts and cleavages in the HSLS. The disputes 
were supposed to be settled consensually within the Coordination. If no consensus had 
been achieved, the disputes were decided by voting, each party having as many votes as 
the seats in the House of Representatives. The other body was the Coordination of the 
Representatives’ Clubs made up of the clubs’ presidents, and chaired by the president of 
the club of the strongest coalition party. The Coordination was tasked with coordinating 
the policies of the coalition partners in the legislature. The decisions were made in the 
same way as the decisions of the Coalition Coordination. In special situations, “when 
the stability of the parliamentary majority may be jeopardized”, the decisions were 
made by the two-thirds majority. Also, a meeting of all representatives of the parlia-
mentary coalition parties might have been convened if necessary.  
 Such a practice of coalition management, and particularly the activities of the 
Coordination of the coalition parties’ presidents, did not go down well with the public. 
It was thought that the real power of decision-making shifted from the formal state in-
stitutions to informal bodies. The coalition government’s foes claimed that – partly be-
cause of their ignorance and the lack of experience with coalitions, and partly because 
of their political hostility towards the SDP as the key coalition party – that a “new Polit-
biro” was running the country.  
 3. The Coalition Agreement of 2000 explicitly regulated the voting procedure in the 
cabinet and in the coalition conflict-resolution bodies but not in the legislature and the 
legislative bodies. The political practice showed that there was an implicit coalition dis-
cipline, but it was uncodified by the Coalition Agreement. In the first half of the man-
date, that discipline was quite strict, only to break down in the second half, to the extent 
that the voting of the coalition partners on the side of the opposition was quite common. 
This practice was most frequently employed by the representatives of the HSS.  
 4. In the distrubution of the ministries and the cabinet appointments, a variety of pat-
terns was followed. Several rules of the department distribution have been identified. 
Ian Budge and Hans Keman (1990: 101-104) suggest that the departments in coalition 
governments are distributed: 1. proportionally to the parties’ share in the legislative 
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mandates and 2. proportionally to the coalition parties’ clout within the coalition, meas-
ured by the pivotal position of individual parties.  
 In Croatia the first rule of the departmental distribution was applied. The Coalition 
Agreement precisely stipulated that the posts in the cabinet and the ministries were to be 
distributed “approximately according to the electoral results”; thus, the SDP would get 
50%, HSLS 25% and the HSS, HNS, LS and the IDS together the other 25% of the 
posts. This rule was applied and implemented in practice, with negligible modifications. 
 The most important government posts – the premiership, the posts of two vicepresi-
dents, the ministers of foreign and internal affairs, and the minister of finances – went to 
the SDP. The post of the deputy prime minister and the minister of defence went to the 
HSLS, partly in line with the rule according to which the strongest coalition parties 
share authority over the most important posts in the government. This rule is typically 
applied in the division of the ministries of the foreign and the internal affairs between 
the two parties in two-member coalitions or between the two strongest parties in multi-
member coalitions; in Croatia it was employed in a somewhat modified form. Also, the 
rule of scrutiny among individual ministries was enforced: the deputy ministers were 
not from the same parties as the ministers.  
 The second criterion was taken into account as well, in several cases. First, the HSS, 
just like all agrariran parties in all European coalition governments, got the post of the 
minister of agriculture and forestry; the SDP, like all other socialdemocratic parties, got 
the post of the minister of labour and welfare, the HSLS, like many liberal parties, got 
the post of the minister of economy. A more marked deviation from the practice of 
European coalition cabinets, in which the ministry of education usually goes to liberal 
or socialist parties, was the fact that in Croatia that post went to the conservative HSS. 
 One of the aspects of the “departmental policy” of coalition governments, also regu-
lated by coalition agreements, was the fashion of cabinet appointments. Two patterns 
can be applied. The first assumes that the coalition members have completely free hands 
when appointing and removing officials in the ministries assigned to them, whereas the 
second pattern curbs this fredom by requiring the approval of the prime minister or even 
other coalition partners. In Croatia the second pattern was adopted, so that all the ap-
pointments for ministers, deputy ministers and ministry secretaries required the “mutual 
approval” of the prime minister and the president of the party that the official is affili-
ated with. A minister’s resignation was the prime minister’s to ask, but ideally “the con-
sent of all the coalition partners in the Coalition Coordination was to be reached”. If the 
prime minister could not obtain the consent of the presidents of all coalition parties, the 
minister in question could nevertheless be removed if the prime minister managed to se-
cure two thirds of the votes in the Coalition Coordination i.e. the support of at least 
three presidents of the coalition parties. 
 Such a pattern is potentially contentious, as was demonstrated in a series of publi-
cized feuds among the coalition parties, although surely there were many more that re-
mained concealed. For example, the president of the LS publicly stated that their candi-
date for the post of the minister of environmental protection, after this position had bee 
vacated, was not approved by the prime minister so that the president of the LS himself 
had to step in, an offer “that could not be refused”. The HSS vetoed the appointment by 
the SDP in 2003 of a history professor for the minister of science, technology and sport; 
he was unacceptable to this rural party because of his public opposition to the clericali-
zation of the educational system. In 2003, the HSS led a failed public campaign for the 
removal of the non-party minister of tourism from the SDP “quota” blaming her for the 
scandal surrounding the privatization of a hotel conglomerate on one Adriatic island. 
 
Kasapović, M., Coalition Governments in Croatia: ..., Politička misao, Vol. XL, (2003), No. 5, pp. 52–67 60 
                                                                                                                                              
Table 1. Distribution of ministerial posts 2000-2003¹  
Government 2000-2002 2002-2003 2003-
PM SDP SDP HDZ
DPM HSLS Libra – 
VP SDP, HSLS SDP, HSS HDZ
MF2 SDP SDP HDZ
MD2 HSLS SDP HDZ
MI2 SDP SDP HDZ
MFA2 SDP SDP HDZ
MPWC HNS HSN – 
ME HSLS SDP – 
MC2 SDP SDP HDZ
MV3 SDP SDP – 
MAF3 HSS HSS HDZ
MSTC HSLS Libra – 
MJALG3 SDP SDP DC 
MEPUP LS LS – 
MEdS HSS HSS – 
MLSW SDP SDP – 
MT SDP SDP – 
MH HSLS Libra – 
MST HSLS SDP – 
MEUI2 IDS SDP HDZ
MCSME HSS HSS – 
M/wp – SDP – 
MFVIS4 – – HDZ
MEdSS4 – – HDZ
MHSW4 – – HDZ
MELE4 – – HDZ
MMETTD4 – – HDZ
MEPUPC4 – – HDZ
¹ The coalition cabinet of 2000-2002 started with 24 members: the prime minister, his deputy, three vice-
presidents and 19 ministers. In the second mandate of 2002-2003, the number of vice-presidents increased to 
four; a vice-president, a woman, became the minister of defense. Also, a ministry without portfolio was estab-
lished, so the number of ministers mushroomed to 20. The coalition government of 2003 abolished the post of 
the deputy prime minister and cut down the number of ministries to 14, so that the cabinet has 15 members. 
The functions of the two government vicepresidents have been taken over by the minister of health and wel-
fare and the minister for Homeland War veterans, family and intergenerational solidarity. Some ministers in 
Ivica Račan’s cabinets (2000-2003) were non-party figures, but were listed in the quotas for the parties that 
had appointed them to their posts. In Prime Minister Ivo Sanader’s cabinet (2003), the non-party figure was 
only the minister of education, science and sport. 
² After the organizational reform of the cabinet in 2003, only six ministries remained unchanged: the Ministry 
of Finances, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minis-
try of Culture and the Ministry for European Integrations.  
³ Three ministries saw their competences formally limited or augmented: the Ministry of Justice, Administra-
tion and Local Self-Government became the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry be-
came the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management; the Ministry of Veterans became the 
Ministry of Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity. 
4 The five newly-created “mammoth” ministries were created by combining the competences of two or even 
more former ministries into one: the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Shipping, Transport and Com-
munications were replaced with the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Tourism, Transport and Development; the 
Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Crafts, Medium and Small Enterprise and a part of the Ministry of La-
bour and Welfare were replaced with the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Enterprise; the Ministry of Public 
Works and Construction and the Ministry of Environmental Protection were replaced by the Ministry of Envi-
ronmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction; the Ministry of Education and Sport and the Min-
istry of Science and Technology merged into the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport; the Ministry of 
Health was created by merging the Ministry of Health and a part of the Ministry of Labour and Welfare. 
PM Prime minister 
DPM Deputy Prime minister 
VP Vice president of the government 
MF Minister of finance 
MD Minister of defense 
MI Minister of interior 
MFA Minister of foreign affaires 
MPWC Minister of public works and construction 
ME Minister of economy 
MC Minister of culture 
MV Minister of war veterans 
MAF Minister of agriculture and forestry 
MSTC Minister of shipping, transport and 
communications 
MJALG Minister of justice, administration and local 
government 
MEPUP Minister of environmental protection and 
urban planning 
MEdS Minister of education and sport 
MLSW Minister of labour and social welfare 
MT Minister of tourism 
MH Minister of health 
MST Minister of science and technology 
MEUI Minister for European integration 
MCSME Minister of crafts, small and medium 
enterprise 
M/wp Minister without portfolio 
MFVIS Minister of family, war veterans and 
intergenerational solidarity 
MEdSS Minister of education, science and sport 
MHSW Minister of health and social welfare 
MELE Minister of economy, labour and enterprise 
MMETTD Minister of maritime economy, tourism, 
transport and development 
MEPUPC Minister of environmental protection, urban 
planning and construction 
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 5. The central document of the Croatian coalition government was formally called 
the Declaration of Post-electoral Priorities, signed on 30 November 1999. This Declara-
tion – together with the inaugural speech of Prime Minister Ivica Račan in the House of 
Representatives on 2 Februrary 2000, in which the goals outlined in the Declaration 
were identified as the new government’s agenda – is a document concisely stating the 
broad general objectives concerning the comprehensive reforms of the political and 
economic system: the transformation of the semipresidential system of government into 
the parliamentary system, the decentralization of the state and the development of the 
local and regional government, the establishment of an independent judiciary, the depo-
litization of the military and the police, the reform of the court system, the transforma-
tion of the Croatian radio & TV into a public institution, the revision of the privatiza-
tion, the reorganization of the bank system, the new fiscal policy, etc. Here are a few 
illustrations how general and sketchy that aspect of the coalition politics was: none of 
the above mentioned agenda-setting documents made any mention of the parliamentary 
reform within the constitutional reform of the political system, necessary for the trans-
formation of the semi-presidential regime into a parliamentary democracy. The gov-
ernment and its majority nevertheless disbanded the second chamber, the House of 
Counties, in the second stage of the constitutional reform of 2001, thereby transforming 
the Croatian Sabor into a unicameral legislature. In no democracy is this sort of a 
change so negligible not to be included in a government’s political agenda. Also, con-
cerning the economic policy, there was no mention of two government projects that 
turned out to be financially most taxing and politically most successful: the com-
mencement of the construction of the Zagreb-Split highway and the incentive house-
building, i.e. a form of social housing. If we compare this with some other coalition 
agreements in some other countries that include much smaller projects, then the failure 
to mention the construction of hundreds of kilometers of highways and thousands of 
flats seems unfathomable unless, of course, this was not planned at the beginning of the 
mandate.  
 6. The agreements on appointments outside the cabinet and the parliament can be 
found in most coalition democracies. In Croatia the appointments included the boards 
and supervisory boards of public companies, public institutions and public funds. All 
those appointments were “subject of the coalition agreement”. The coalition agreed that 
these appointments were to be assigned according to the general “quota pattern” also 
applied in the distribution of the leading positions in the cabinet and the legislature. The 
coalition partners let it be known that in their political appointments they were to take 
into account the candidates’ competence.  
 
Mechanisms of terminating coalition governments’ mandates 
 Wolfgang Müller and Kare Strøm (1997; 2000) mention three groups of reasons that 
lead to and mark the termination of the mandate of coalition governments: 1. technical 
(regular parliamentary elections, constitutional grounds and the incumbent prime min-
ister’s death), 2. behavioural patterns (early elections, a vote of no-confidence to the in-
cumbent government in the legislature, a discretional enlargement of the coalition, a 
conflict among the coalition partners, a conflict in a coalition party), 3. critical events 
(non-parliamentary elections, public pressures, economic crisis, internal security, pri-
vate reasons of cabinet members). Bernard Grofman and Peter van Roozendaal (1997: 
425) suggest that the termination of a coalition’s mandate is induced by: the new par-
liamentary elections, death or illness of a leading cabinet members, a no-confidence 
vote in the legislature, the collapse of a coalition due to its internal discord, a govern-
ment’s unforced resignation, and a conflict between the cabinet and the head of state. 
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 If we apply these two groups of criteria to Croatia’s case, there were two coalition 
governments in the legislative mandate of 2000-2003 with the same prime minister: the 
first in 2000-2002 and the second in 2002-2003.11 The termination of the first coalition 
government was brought about by the feuding of the coalition partners and by the HSLS 
quitting the coalition government and the ruling parliamentary majority. The feuding 
was brought on by the ideological and political disagreements between the HSLS and 
the other coalition members, primarily the SDP, the chief HSLS’s coalition partner in 
the election of 2000. One of the major bones of contention and later the underlying rea-
son of the collapse of the coalition, in the words of the president of the HSLS, was that 
the coalition, and particularly the SDP, was smothering and destroying his party’s iden-
tity, endangering its survival in the political arena. It turned out, however, that the 
HSLS president and its leadership miscalculated the consequences of their decision to 
leave the coalition, as it was this very act that destroyed the party. Following the split 
within the party, the HSLS was trounced at the parliamentary elections in 2003. But for 
the big implosion of the SDP – which in the parliamentary elections in 1992 won only 
5.5% of the votes, 29.5% fewer than in the elections of 1990 – this was the most dra-
matic implosion of any Croatian parliamentary party in the short period of its competi-
tive politics. In the electoral coalition with the SDP in 2000 the HSLS got about 41% of 
the votes and 24 mandates, in 2003 in the electoral coalition with the DC it got only 
about 4% of the national votes and mere two mandates. 
 This decision of the party’s president, supported by the majority of the senior mem-
bers, resulted in the rift within the party and the secession of the cabinet/parliamentary 
faction that eventually formed a new liberal party. Underpinning the factioning within 
the HSLS were the ideological, political and personal disagreements and clashes in the 
party – usually described as the conflicts between the left and the right liberals or the 
genuine and the nationalist liberals – that came to head regarding the issue of the nature 
and performance of the coalition government, the place and the responsibility of the 
HSLS in it and finally, the rationale of staying in the ruling coalition. While the HSLS 
ministers, including the party’s president Dražen Budiša, at the time a cabinet vicepresi-
dent, and most HSLS representatives stepped out of the ruling coalition, 10 representa-
tives and 3 ministers of the future new liberal party stayed on. This did not bring into 
question the absolute parliamentary majority that supported the government, so that 
Prime Minister Ivica Račan’s second coalition government easily ensured a confidence 
vote in the legislature. This government was made up of five parties (SDP, HSS, HNS, 
LS, Libra), and its mandate was terminated through the regular parliamentary elections 
in November of 2003. In short, the cause of the termination of the mandate of the first 
coalition government belongs into the category of “behavioural patterns”, while the sec-
ond coalition government had its mandate terminated through the regular parliamentary 
elections, the standard technical reason.  
 The first coalition government of 2000-2002 turned out to be more durable than the 
average cabinets of oversized coalitions. In his comparative analysis of the durability of 
five types of government – single-party governments, minimal winning coalition gov-
ernments, minority one-party coalition governments, minority coalition governments 
and oversized coalition governments – in 31 parliamentary democracy over a 40-year 
period (1945-1996), Arend Lijphart (1999: 137) found out that only the minority gov-
ernments are less stable than the oversized coalition governments. The average duration 
 
11 In a strictly formal sense, it could be said that there were three coalition cabinets since as early as 2001 
the sole IDS minister stepped down. The IDS, however, remained in the ruling parliamentary coalition and 
continued to support the government, so that this affair failed to shake the government and jeopardize it in any 
way.  
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of 120 oversized coalition governments during that time span was only 1.71 years or 
about 624 days. The oversized coalition government in Croatia lasted about two and a 
half years or 903 days, about nine and a half months longer than the average.  
 Finally, a cabinet’s stability can be measured by the stability of its ministerial posts; 
in that respect, the Croatian coalition government was very stable, much more so than 
the previous one-party governments. All cabinet members from the HSS and the HNS, 
as well as all the original minsters from the SDP, except the minister of justice, went 
through their full four-year mandate as did the prime minister and his deputy. The LS 
replaced its minister only once. The ministers were mostly replaced only in the depart-
ments vacated by the IDS and the HSLS. In comparison, in the course of the first in-
complete mandate (1990-92), the one-party HDZ governments changed three prime 
ministers, in the second incomplete mandate (1992-95) two prime ministers; only in the 
third mandate (1995-2000) the government was headed by only one prime minister. The 
fluctuation of ministers in the HDZ’s one-party governments was incomparably higher 
than in the coalition governments. 
 In principle it might be said that this above the average durability of the Croatian 
coalition government, as well as its failure to go through its full mandate without any 
changes in its composition, stemmed from some structural reasons and some critical 
events (Grofman and van Roozendaal, 1997). 
 The government owed its durability primarily to the balance of power in the legisla-
ture, to the party system and to the government’s ideological profile. Both coalition 
governments enjoyed the support of a relatively absolute and stable majority in the par-
liament. Although the government’s party composition seemed formally unfavourable 
due to the big number of parties it comprised during its entire legislative mandate, there 
was the core party or the “dominant political player”12 that proved to be immune to fac-
tioning, which is otherwise typical of most Croatian transitional parties; consequently, 
the party was the government’s backbone. Three out of six (2000-2) and two out of five 
(2002-3) government parties were a sort of “marginal parties” with one minister each. 
These were no pivot parties whose departure would jeopardize the entire government. 
Besides, there were no extreme left or extreme right parties in the government; this was 
a centre-left government, amongst whose members there were no major cleavages con-
cerning the fundamental political goals or many public policies.  
 The stability of the government was enhanced by its political and economic achieve-
ments. The government broke through the international political isolation in which 
Croatia found itself during the decade of the HDZ rule (1990-2000) and inititated the 
processes of rapprochement and integration of the country into the international political 
and economic organizations and institutions from which it had been barred.13 Also, the 
government democratized the country by its institutional/political reforms and the 
changes in the norms of political behaviour, and put an end to the numerous ill-effects 
 
12 In line with Hans Keman’s pattern (1994, 139), a party is dominant if the number of its seats in the 
parliament is equal or bigger than the quotient 100 : N, N being the number of effective parliamentary parties. 
In the fourth mandate, the SDP had 31.4% of the seats which is more than 22.2% (100 : 4.5).   
13 Between 2000 and 2003, Croatia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), signed the Central-
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), joined the Partnership for Peace, signed the Agreement on Stabi-
lization and Accession to the EU, submitted its request for EU membership; in June of 2004 it achieved the 
status of a candidate.  
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of the authoritarian style of governing of the previous period.14 It enabled economic 
growth: in 1999 Croatia had a negative rate of growth of GNP of –0.9%, which later 
reached 2.9% (2000), 4.4% (2001), 5.2% (2002) and 4.3% (2003). Some massive pro-
jects were launched and partly completed: construction of roads, incentive housebuild-
ing, modernization of the railway system, reorganization of the banking system, the in-
ternal debt was settled, the nominal and the real indicators of the growth of living stan-
dard increased, unemployment was reduced, etc.  
 
Table 2. Croatian governments 1990-2003 





Stjepan Mesić  30/5/90-24/8/90  One-party HDZ¹ Presidential decision  
Josip Manolić  24/8/90-17/7/91  One-party HDZ¹ Presidential decision  
Franjo Gregorić  17/7/91-12/8/92  All-party  
HDZ, SDP, HNS, 
HSLS, HDS, SDH, 
SSH  
Early elections 
Hrvoje Šarinić  12/8/92-3/4/93  One-party  HD Presidential decision  
Nikica Valentić  3/ 4/93-7/11/95  One-party  HDZ² Early elections 
Zlatko Mateša  7/11/95-27/1/00 One-party  HDZ Regular elections 




Ivica Račan (II)  30/7/02-23/12/03 Coalition  SDP, HSS, LS, HNS, Libra³  Regular elections 
Ivo Sanader  23/12/03- Coalition  HDZ, DC   
¹  In the cabinets of prime ministers S. Mesić and J. Manolić, there was one minister from the HDS and a few 
non-party ministers.  
² In the cabinet of prime minister N. Valentić there was a minister from the HSS and some non-party 
ministers. 
³ In both coalition cabinets of prime minister I. Račan there were some non-party ministers appointed in 
accordance with the party quotas of the coalition partners. 
 
 The inability of the first coalition to complete its full four-year mandate structurally 
stemmed above all from the big number of parties in the government and from a pleth-
ora of issue-related disputes that eventually caused the fissures in the policy space that 
revealed, deepened and exacerbated the political and ideological differences among the 
 
14 In a regular survey conducted by the Freedom House, in 2002 Croatia found itself for the first time on 
the list of free countries. Until then, it had regularly been included in the category of semi-free countries. In 
the period of coalition governments, Croatia went through a kind of the second wave of democratization, that 
included the democratization of the HDZ as the proponent of the authoritarain politics and authoritarian gov-
erning style in the prior decade. On the nature and the classifications of the type of the political regime in 
Croatia 1990-2000, see Kasapović, 2001. 
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coalition members that did not exist or were not noticeable at the beginning. Some for-
eign policy issues, especially the policy regarding the International Court for War 
Crimes Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague in relation 
to the extradition of the indicted Croatian generals, the policy of privatization, agricul-
ture, education and so on, it soon became obvious that the coalition parties were on the 
opposite ends of the typical postcommunist transitional axis of polarization e.g. modern-
traditional, liberal-conservative or secular-clerical. In the mandate of the first coalition 
government this division was mostly manifested in the polarization of the SDP, HNS, 
IDS and the LS, on the one hand, and the HSLS on the other. In the mandate of the sec-
ond coalition government, the HSS increasingly clashed with the other coalition part-
ners because of its traditionalist, conservative and clericalist demands and attitudes. 
 It may be said that the critical event that served as the “crisis trigger” in the ruling 
coalition and greatly contributed to the departure of the HSLS was the government’s 
policy towards the Hague Tribunal and the reactions it provoked in the country. Already 
in the summer of 2000 there emerged a rightist political movement which initiated a se-
ries of mass rallies under the guise of the fight against the policy of the “criminalization 
of the Homeland War” that was allegedly pursued by the new government of the left-
centre in their cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. The movement’s core was made up 
of an array of associations of the former veterans, volunteers and defenders that estab-
lished the “headquarters for the defence of the dignity of the Homeland War”. Publicly 
or tacitly, they were supported by a part of the military and the police structures, the 
senior Catholic Church clergy, the radical right-wing parliamentary and non-parlia-
mentary parties, including the oppositional HDZ, the right-wing populist trade unions, 
some media and so on. They demanded the ouster of the government, the resignation of 
the president of the state, an emergency session of the parliament, and created a genuine 
pre-putchist atmosphere in the country. These events reached their apogee in the anti-
government political diatribe of 12 Croatian Army generals who were immediately sent 
into retirement by the president. However, the government enjoyed enough support by 
the democratic public not to succumb to this attempt of an extra-institutional rightist 
coup. Still, these events undoubtedly left their mark on the divisions within the coalition 
and precipitated the departure of the HSLS.  
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